The Economist is running an article this week on the region blamed as the source of most of the insurgent and anarchic forces in South Asia.
“Briefing: Waziristan, The Last Frontier,” The Economist, Jan. 2, 2010, pp. 17-20
The Economist is running an article this week on the region blamed as the source of most of the insurgent and anarchic forces in South Asia.
“Briefing: Waziristan, The Last Frontier,” The Economist, Jan. 2, 2010, pp. 17-20
Pankaj Mishra, writing in the current issue of The New York Review of Books (“Afghanistan: The India & Kashmir Connection,” Jan. 14, 2010, p. 52), says that failure to resolve the conflict between Pakistan and India over Kashmir (“the rusty nail in South Asia’s body politic”) will continue to be a major driving force behind events throughout South Asia. The pro-India foreign policy of the United States, which extends even to legitimizing India’s nuclear capacity, is the major reason why Pakistan distrusts American intentions in the region and why Pakistan is likely to offer only limited cooperation in the war in Afghanistan and the war on terror.
“Convinced that America will turn away from Islamabad just as it did after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, Pakistan’s military leaders will be increasingly reluctant to fall in line with Obama’s announced objectives…As always, the road to stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan runs through the valley of Kashmir, and Obama’s failure to even mention a likely solution to the subcontinent’s primary conflict will doom his new strategy just as surely as his other decision to continue assassinating suspected militants with drone missiles.”
Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari pushes back in today’s Op-Ed page of the New York Times (“How to Mend Fences With Pakistan”) against those who charge that his country is not doing enough in the war on terrorism. He accuses the United States of playing a role in the rise of Al Qaeda and the Taliban by supporting these groups during the war to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan (but greatly understates the role his own country played in supporting these groups as well). He advises the United States to exercise more neutrality in South Asia:
“Although we certainly appreciate America’s $7.5 billion pledge over the next five years for nonmilitary projects in Pakistan, this long-term commitment must be complemented by short-term policies that demonstrate American neutrality and willingness to help India and Pakistan overcome their mutual distrust. It could start by stepping up its efforts to mediate the Kashmir dispute.”
Zardari levels criticism at his own country, too, especially its tendency to deny its responsibility for where it finds itself and its tendency to blame others for its problems:
“In recent days, I have thought often of something my wife, Benazir, wrote in the days before her death: ‘It is so much easier to blame others for our problems than to accept responsibility ourselves.’ Benazir added that conspiracy theories and ‘toxic rhetoric’ were ‘an opiate that keeps Muslims angry against external enemies and allows them to pay little attention to the internal causes of intellectual and economic decline.’”
In its lead editorial today, the New York Times calls upon President Obama to “persuade the Pakistanis that the United States is in it for the long haul this time.” One of the main obstacles, the Times notes, is that “there are many Pakistani officials – and not just in the intelligence services – that continue to see the Taliban as an ally and long-term proxy to limit India’s influence in Afghanistan.” (“Pakistan and the War,” Dec. 8, 2009)
Seth G. Jones, a civilian military advisor in Afghanistan, argued on the Op-Ed page of yesterday’s New York Times that winning there is impossible unless the war is taken to the Taliban strongholds in Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province.
Seth. G. Jones, “Take the War to Pakistan,” New York Times (Op-Ed), Dec. 4, 2009
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/04/AR2009120400673.html?hpid=topnews
Although it is mainly a hard news story chronicling the ongoing suicide bombings in Pakistan,on the last page it is interesting to note how some Pakistanis blame the U.S. and/or India for orchestrating the attacks, rather than taking a good look in the mirror at the problems they might, or in this case clearly do, have in their country.
-WW
President Obama’s attempt to please everyone across the American political spectrum and many parties abroad has created an uphill struggle for him in Afghanistan. With respect to what is going on in Afghanistan itself, Juan Cole lists ten forces working against the President.
This week’s issue of The Economist (Oct. 17th-23rd) features a Leader (p.15) and two articles (pp. 31-36) on the worsening situation in South Asia, mostly in Afghanistan, but increasingly also in Pakistan. Some of the main points:
Conspicuously missing from The Economist’s analysis and recommendations is any role that neighboring countries like China, India, and Iran might play in stabilizing South Asia. Amitav Ghosh, one of India’s best known writers, visited NMH earlier this week. He told my sophomore class that China, India, and Iran could together solve the crisis if some of the big players in what Ahmed Rashid calls “the new Great Game” would include them. This would be hard for the United States because it has a huge stake in controlling the flow and distribution of natural resources (especially oil and natural gas) in the region. Ghosh argued that the United States has become badly over-extended. Its campaign to control these resources cannot be sustained in the long run.
Dexter Filkins, author of The Forever War, writes about American odds for success in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Excerpt:
“IN AMERICA, the chorus is insistent and growing: scale back the Afghan mission. It’s too hard and too expensive, and we’ve overstayed our welcome.
George F. Will, the columnist, recently said as much. So did Rory Stewart, the British scholar-diplomat who has spent years in the region. Vice President Biden is said to favor such a choice.
The exact shape of a scaled-down commitment is not clear, but it goes something like this: American Special Forces units, aided by Predator drones, can keep Al Qaeda off-balance, while American soldiers stay on to train the Afghan Army and the police…
The bulk of Al Qaeda’s leadership, [Richard] Haass pointed out, is now in Pakistan. That’s where the United States should really be focused — in Pakistan, with a population six times larger than Afghanistan’s and with at least 60 nuclear warheads.”
Dexter Filkins, “Stanley McCrystal’s Long War,” New York Times Magazine, Oct. 18, 2009
See also Jane Perlez, “Pakistan Attacks Show Tighter Militant Links,” New York Times, Oct. 16, 2009, p. A1, in which she reports,
“A wave of attacks against top security installations over the last several days demonstrated that the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and militant groups once nurtured by the government are tightening an alliance aimed at bringing down the Pakistani state, government officials and analysts said.”
What can Pakistan expect as it prepares to launch a major offensive against the Taliban in South Waziristan?
Story at BBC - maps, details on likely tactics and military challenges to both sides.